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RECENT DECISIONS
assert no tort claim against his benefactor.as However, Neil, Ch. J., in
Gamble v. Vanderbilt University"' says:
"There are cases from time to time occurring, and not alto-
gether infrequent, to which it is, as it seems to us, impossible
to apply it-patients conveyed to hospitals in demented condi-
tion, persons temporarily unconscious from injuries and who re-
quire immediate surgical and other attention, those who are so
debilitated by disease to have no power of understanding the
terms of a contract, children too young to understand the mean-
ing of a contract, or to make or be bound by one in any form, or
even to understand the nature of the work to be done for them.
How can such persons be held to waive a right of action which
the law gives them? How can they be held to have agreed to an
exemption ?"
Some courts refuse to recognize any of these doctrines and hold a
charitable institution liable if negligent.'s Courts generally impose lia-
bility where a stranger is injured by defendant's agents, 9 or to a ser-
vant,20 or to a business visitor,21 or if a safe place statute is applicable. 22
JoHN D. STEIN
Torts - Communist not Slander per se - Plaintiff, business man-
ager for a labor union, brought action for slander. The complaint
alleged the defendants said, "He, Plaintiff, is a dirty low down Com-
munist, that Mr. Krumholz, Plaintiff, and the union are a bunch of
Communists, and that Mr. Krumholz is a dirty Communist." Defen-
dants moved for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint was legally
insufficient, and did not state a cause of action. Held: The New York
Supreme Court, Special Term, ruled that calling a person a Communist
was not slander per se and could not be maintained in the absence of
allegations that plaintiff suffered damage through injury to his busi-
ness or property. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend.
It was necessary to plead that the statements made referred to or con-
cerned the plaintiff in his business for the words to be actionable per
16 Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219 (1918); Burdell v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 P. 1008 (1918).
"7 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1917).
Is Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 A. 120, 14 A.L.R. 576 (1912).
'9 Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Asso., 102 Neb. 343, 167 N.W. 208 (1918);
Simmon v. Wiley M. E. Church, 112 N.J.L. 129, 170 A. 237 (1934).20 Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910).
21 Cohen v. General Hospital Soc. of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435
(1931).
22 Wilson v. Evangelical Luthern Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930);
Wis. Stat. (1947) sec. 101.06 provides: "... Every employer and every owner
of a place of employment or a public building now or hereafter constructed
shall so construct, repair, or maintain such place of employment or public
building.., as to render the same safe."
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se. There was no such allegation, and it cannot be said as a matter of
law that the words used concerned the plaintiff in his business. Krum-
holz v. Raffer et.al., 91 N.Y.Supp.(2d.) 743. (New York 1949).
This court applied the common law rule that in slander not action-
able per se, special damages or injury to property or business must be
alleged to recover. This case did not fall within the slander per se
cases because it did not involve words imputing commission of a
punishable offense, or words imputing a contagious disease, or words
imputing unfitness to perform duties or public office, or words which
tend to prejudice the party in his profession or trade.' The rules for
slander were developed in four different courts of England; the local,
ecclesiastical, common law, and Star Chamber. There was no distinc-
tion between libel and slander in the local, ecclesiastical or common law
courts. The remedy for defamation was the action of trespass on the
case for words spoken, the essence of that action being the pleading and
proving of damage, if the words were not such that damage would be
presumed. The distinction between libel and slander developed with
the advent of printing, when the Star Chamber took jurisdiction over
printed matter and all writing generally and introduced for the first time
into English law a new type of defamation based upon mere form. Libel
for written defamation was actionable without proof of special dam-
ages, because the damage was presumed; while slander for spoken
defamation if not actionable per se could only be maintained by plead-
ing special damages or injury to the plaintiff's business or property.2
The common law rule is still the rule today and is part of the Restate-
ment of Torts.
3
The primary reason assigned by the courts to justify the imposition
of broader liability for libel than for slander has been the greater ca-
pacity for harm that a writing is assumed to have because of a wide
range of dissemination consequent upon its permanence in form.4 In
the instant case the judge ruled that calling a person a Communist is
not slanderous per se, and allegation of special damages became neces-
sary to maintain the action,5 because words not actionable in themselves
become so only by reason of some special damage occasioned by them,
and such special damage must be averred particularly in the complaint.6
1 Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 226, 23 L.Ed. 308 (D.C., 1876).
2 History of Defamation, 1949:99-126, Wis.L.Rev.; Restatement of Torts, Sec-
tion 568, note (b).
3 Restatement of Torts, Sections 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575; Pollard v. Lyon,
Fn. 1, supra.
4 Hartman v. Winchell, 73 N.E. (2d) 31, 34, 171 A.L.R. 759 (N.Y., 1947).
- Waldron v. Time Inc., 83 N.Y.Supp. (2d) 826 (1948).
o 53 C.J.S. 269, Section 170 (c); Bush v. McMann, 12 Colo.App. 504, 55 Pac.
956 (1899) ; Field v. Colson, 93 Ky- 347, 20 S.W. 264 (1892; Fillman v. Dre-
fous, 47 L.Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895).
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Although calling a person a Communist is not slander per se, it has
been held libel per se to write that a person is a Communist,7 because
the label of Communist today in the minds of many average respectable
persons places one beyond the pale of respectability, and makes him a
symbol of public hatred." The fact that it may be legal to be a Com-
munist or a Communist sympathizer does not prevent such a charge
from being libelous per se, as a publication need not impute a crime to
constitute a libel.9
Today and for some time in the past, there has been widespread
public aversion for Communism, its adherents and sympathizers.
Whether or not Communism stands for violent overthrow of our gov-
ernment or orderly process of political activity-in either interpreta-
tion or understanding a large segment of our populace attaches to the
activities of Communists an odorous interpretion that tends toward
public aversion."0
Canada, among the common law countries, has taken the initiative
in merging libel and slander through its conference of Commissioners
on Uniformity of Legislation which, in 1944, prepared a Uniform Def-
amation Act. The act abolishes the distinction between libel and slan-
der and makes all defamatory publications actionable without proof of
damages or, as the Act puts it, "damage shall be presumed."' 1 Thus
in the jurisdictions in Canada where this act has been enacted the plain-
tiff in the instant case could have maintained his action and recovered
without pleading special damages.
It is the opinion of the writer that the distinction between libel and
slander should remain in the law. In the instant case, had the plaintiff
suffered damage to his property or business he could have recovered
as the decision intimated. Therefore his remedy was adequate, for the
purpose of civil law is reparation and compensation, not punishment.
The distinction between spoken and written words as to permanence
and effect seems as sound now as it was when the rule was first de-
clared. The reason for the distinction still exists. The Canadian rule
opens the door to recovery at random for mere name calling in the
absence of damage, and leans toward liability based upon punishment,
not reparation or compensation.
EMIL SEBETIC
7 Burrell v. Moran et.al., 82 N.E. (2d) 334 (Ohio, 1948); Levy v. Gelber, 175
Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.Supp. (2d) 148 (1941); Oppenheim v. Gunther, 85 N.Y.
Supp. (2d) 210, 193 Misc. 914 (1948); Notre Dame L.Rev. 24:542-9 (Summer
49).
8 Spanel et.al. v. Pegler, 160 F. (2d) 619, 571 A.L.R. 699 (Fed.Ct., 1947).
9 Fn. 8, supra.
10 Burrell v. Moran et.al., Fn. 7, supra.
"The Act was encated as law by Manitoba, 1946 (1946,Man.C.11), and by Al-
berta, 1947 (1947,Abta.C.14).
